



INTEGRATED NUCLEAR SECURITY SUPPORT PLAN

GEORGIA

2015-2019



Functional Area 1: Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1.A Objective– Establish formal governmental organization and measures for managing the national nuclear security regime

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|--|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1.A.1 | Designate national <i>Competent Authorities</i> and clearly identify and define national nuclear security responsibilities of these <i>Competent Authorities</i> . | Government | Complete | 2012 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection (MENRP) has been designated as a Regulatory Body by the Law on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (#5912, 20.03.2012) Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (DNRS) was established by the Law for practical implementation of the regulatory functions. • Law on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Art.9) states that the competent State bodies in the nuclear and radiation safety field are as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia – issuing a permit for construction of nuclear and radiation facilities and provision of metrological support to ionizing radiation control devices. ✓ Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia – ensuring and supervising the preparedness for national and trans-border radiation accidents and the liquidation of their consequences, the physical protection of nuclear and radiation facilities (other than the facilities containing/ operating the generators of ionizing radiation); ensuring the safety of the shipment, import, export and transit of radioactive materials; coordinating the efforts to avoid and prevent the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. ✓ Ministry of Defence of Georgia – ensuring the safety and physical protection of the nuclear and radiation facilities being under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence: Taking part in the liquidation of the consequences of nuclear accident or radiological emergency to the extent of the emergency response plan as well as in other activities provided by law. ✓ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia – exercising control over the fulfilment of Georgia’s commitments under international agreements, coordinating relations with international organizations. ✓ Ministry of Finances of Georgia – exercising control over nuclear and radioactive materials as they are exported from, imported into, and |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|--|---|-------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> transited across the territory of Georgia; Issuing of permits for export, import, re-export, or transit of double-purpose commodities |
| 1.A.2 | Ensure that the <i>regulatory body</i> has appropriate independence in its nuclear security decision making. | Government | Complete | 2014-2015 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The MENRP is effectively independent in its operation. The Ministry reports to the Prime Minister. The budget of MENPR is designated by the State. It is independent from license holders. Regulatory activities are implemented by DNRS (Art 6, Paragraphs 1-2 of the Law 5912). DNRS is a structural unit of the Ministry (Art. 6 of the Statute of the MENRP approved by Decree N 98 of the Government of Georgia). To enhance regulatory system for nuclear and radiation safety and security it is planned to transform DNRS to Legal Entity of Public Law within MENRP (Order of Georgian Government N528) |
| 1.A.3 | Establish national nuclear security committee or other measures to ensure proper coordination and communication among <i>competent authorities</i> , and between <i>competent authorities</i> and <i>authorized persons</i> in fulfilling their nuclear security responsibilities. | Government DNRS MENRP MOIA SSS SSCMC | On-going | 2016 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to the decree of Government of Georgia on “Establishment of State Security and Crisis Management Council and its Statute” (#38, 06 January 2014) and Law on “National Security Policy Planning and Coordination” (#3126-IIs, 04 March 2015), the State Security and Crisis Management Council is established for preparation of political decisions on external and internal policy and strategy related state security issues on defence, stability and order to manage all types of crisis situations having actual and/or potential implications to state security and provision of such decisions to the Prime Minister of Georgia Interagency Coordination Council to Counter Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear Threats established By Government decree #201 (21.02.2014) The council is leaded by the Deputy minister of internal Affairs of Georgia and consists of all state actors such as Prime Minister’s office, State Security and Crisis Management Council, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection,, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Agriculture, LEPL (Legal Entity of Public Law) National Forensics Bureau, LEPL Tbilisi State University, LEPL National Centre for Disease Control and Public Health, LEPL Richard G. Lugar Research Centre for Public Health of National Centre for Disease Control and Public Health, LEPL Revenue Service, Commission on Nuclear and Radiation Safety Problems of Georgian National Academy of Science. The Apparatus of National Security Council of Georgia, USA Embassy in Georgia, EU Mission to Georgia, and Tbilisi Regional Secretariat of EU Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear Risks Reduction Centres for Excellences have also been invited to participate. By Decree No. 49 of 14 January 2014 the Government of Georgia created an Interagency Council for elaboration of a State Border Managements Strategy and supplementary action plan. |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|---|
| 1.A.4 | Provide international training for senior government officials to familiarize them with a broad view of a national nuclear security regime. | Government IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Georgia participates in working of International Network for Nuclear Security Trainings and Support Centres IAEA National Awareness Training Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking, Tbilisi, Georgia, 30 Aug.-03 Sept, 2004 IAEA National Training for First line officers , Poti, Georgia, 15-19 October 2017 IAEA DBT workshop for state organizations, October 2011 The US DoE GTRI supports SAS (Security Awareness Seminar) and PPSM (Physical Protection of Sources and Materials training) annually since 2010 National CBRN Threat Reduction action plan considers conducting of trainings for personnel on nuclear security issues. |

1.B Objective – Adhere to legally binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|--------------------|------------------|----------------------|---------|
| 1.B.1 | <p>a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the <i>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | Government | Party | Oct. 2007 | |
| 1.B.2 | <p>a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the <i>Amendment to Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNME)</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | Government | Party | Mar. 2012 | |
| 1.B.3 | a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the | Government | Party | Nov 2010 | |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------------|--|--------------------|------------------|----------------------|---|
| | <p><i>Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | | | | |
| 1.B.4 | <p>a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the <i>Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | Government | Non-party | 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accession to be reinitiated by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection of Georgia. |
| 1.B.5 | <p>a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the <i>International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombings Convention)</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | Government | Party | 2004 | |
| 1.B.6 | <p>a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the <i>International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention)</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | Government | Party | 2010 | |
| 1.B.7 | <p>a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the <i>Convention for the Suppression of</i></p> | Government | Party | 2006 | |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------------|--|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------|
| | <p><i>Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention)</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | | | | |
| 1.B.8 | <p>a. Become party to and adhere to the obligations of States Parties in the <i>Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (1988 Fixed Platforms Protocol)</i></p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear and radiological security related activities, if needed</p> | Government | Party | 2006 | |

1. C Objective – Comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relevant to nuclear security

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------------|---|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1.C.1 | <p>a. Adhere to the obligations of States Parties under Chapter VII of the UN Charter contained in UNSCR 1373</p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear security related activities</p> | Government | Reporting | Continuous | |
| 1.C.2 | <p>a. Adhere to the obligations of States Parties under Chapter VII of the UN Charter contained in UNSCR 1540</p> <p>b. Request IAEA assistance to implement those provisions relevant to nuclear security related activities</p> | Government | Reporting | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 reports: 28 October 2004, 17 December 2007, 2 October 2013 |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

1. D Objective–Applylegally non-binding international instruments

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|--|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---|
| 1.D.1 | Implement recommendations contained in Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (IAEA-INFCIRC/225/Rev 5.) | Government | On-going | 2016 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to the requirements of Georgian Law ‘On Nuclear and Radiation Safety’ a new regulation” On Physical Security (Protection) of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities, Radioactive Sources and Waste, and Other Sources of Ionising” should be issued until January 1, 2016. The regulation should considers recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 |
| 1.D.2 | Endorse and implement the guidance contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. | Government | Complete | March 2012 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Statement at 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: the principles of the Code of Conduct will be reflected in the nuclear security related documents of Georgia, to be adopted in the process of developing the national legal basis. |
| 1.D.3 | Endorse and implement the guidance contained in the Supplementary Guidance to the Code of Conduct on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. | Government | Complete | March 2012 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Statement at 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: the principles of the Code of Conduct will be reflected in the nuclear security related documents of Georgia, to be adopted in the process of developing the national legal basis. |

1. E Objective–Establish a legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear security

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1.E.1 | Regularly review existing laws to determine where provisions specifically related to nuclear security issues (e.g., physical protection, illicit trafficking, import-export, border control, waste management, transportation, penalties, criminal offenses, etc.) could usefully be added or amended, taking into account international legal instruments, recommendations and IAEA guidelines (gap analysis). | MENPR; Ministry of Finances; MOIA, MOD; SSS | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Law on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (5912) is a main legislation identifying and distributing the responsibilities among the state bodies. Several legal documents addressed to nuclear and radiation safety and security issues as well, such as Law on Civil Safety (#2467, 29.05.2014), Law on Control of Military and Dual-purpose Products (#1683, 29.11.2013.), Criminal Code (#2287, 22.07.1999.), Law on Licenses and Permits (#1775, 24.06.2005). Further development of legal basis for nuclear security regime within the country is ongoing (Section 1E). Secondary regulations such as Order of Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Protection # 150 “Rules on response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material”(08.12.2014), Order of Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Protection #75 “Rules on inspection of nuclear and radiation activities”(01.10.2013), Order of Government #689 “Rules on inventory of sources of ionizing radiation, radioactive waste and authorization, categorization of the sources of ionizing radiation” (19.12.2014), Order of Government #756 “Rules on radiation monitoring of scrap metal” (31.12.2014) were already adopted. Law on Nuclear and Radiation Safety identifies responsibility to issue other |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|---|-------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | | | | <p>regulations till the year 2016. Some of them addressed to nuclear security issues, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Regulation on security and physical protection of nuclear and radiation facilities, sources of ionizing radiation and radioactive waste; ✓ Emergency preparedness and response plan to nuclear and radiological emergencies; ✓ Rules on implementation of safeguard agreement and non-proliferation activities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Georgia adopted CBRN Risk Reduction Strategy and associated action plan for the time period of 2015-2019 (Order of Government #164, 14.02.2014.) • Decree of Government #397 (24 December 2010) “rules for joint action in case of detection of radioactive materials at border checkpoints, airports, sea ports and maritime areas” identifies responsible agencies and procedures for respective actions. |
| 1.E.2 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, advisory/ familiarization missions to enhance senior level governmental officials’ and legislators’ knowledge and understanding of international instruments that constitute the international legal framework for nuclear security. | IAEA/NSNS IAEA/OLA | On-going | Continuous | |
| 1.E.3 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, peer review missions to advise on and assist in reviewing/drafting laws with specific provisions for nuclear security. | MENRP Ministry of Finance MOIA SSS MOD IAEA/NSNS IAEA/OLA | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In December 2010 the U.S. Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) convened a workshop to review the Georgian criminal code and recommend revisions where needed. • Review of draft amendment to law “On Nuclear and Radiation Safety” and draft law “On Radiative Waste” was conducted by IAEA, US and Sweden specialist. The corresponded comments were issued and considered as they were appropriate. |
| 1.E.4 | Develop draft proposals for necessary amendments to national laws relevant to nuclear security. | MENPR Ministry of Finances MOIA SSS MOD | On-going | 2016 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draft amendment to the Law on Nuclear and radiation Safety and the Law on Radioactive waste prepared together with complementary drafts of changes in corresponding legal documents already prepared and sent to Parliament of Georgia for ratification (anticipated till January 2016) • Secondary regulation on security and physical protection of facilities and sources of ionizing radiation is under preparation (to be adopted since 2016) |
| 1.E.5 | Submit amendments or draft laws for action by appropriate bodies under Georgia’s legal procedures. | MENPR Ministry of Finances, MOIA | To be submitted | Q3 2015 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draft amendment to the Law on Nuclear and radiation Safety and the Law on Radioactive waste together with complementary drafts of changes in corresponding legal documents already submitted to Parliament of Georgia for ratification (anticipated till January 2016) |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|---|------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | SSS MOD | | | |
| 1.E.6 | Adopt new legislative measures by Georgia's relevant bodies. | Parliament of Georgia | To be ratified | 01.01.2016. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft amendment to the Law on Nuclear and Radiation Safety Draft Law on Radioactive Waste |
| 1.E.7 | Develop or amend and regularly review regulations, requirements, associated procedures, and law enforcement systems and measures to ensure proper protections and controls are in place to meet nuclear security provisions set forth in national statutes. | MENPR Ministry of Finances, MOIA SSS | | | |
| 1.E.8 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, peer review missions to advise on and assist in reviewing/drafting regulations, requirements, associated procedures, and law enforcement systems and measures with specific provisions for nuclear security. | IAEA/NSNS | To be requested | 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Georgia will request expert assistance needed to review drafts of relevant regulations |

1. F Objective – Implement regulations, requirements, associated procedures, and law enforcement systems and measures with provisions for nuclear security

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|--|--|------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1.F.1 | License activities or grant authorization only when such activities comply with physical protection regulations, requirements, associated procedures, and law enforcement systems. | MENPR MOIA SSS | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The procedure for issue of license and permit is defined by Law 5912 (Articles 15-17, 18 19) and law "On Licenses and Permits" (Chapter 3). The license applicant is obliged to submit radiation safety and nuclear security plans, which should be reviewed by DNRS and Emergency Management Agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. |
| 1.F.2 | Include import and export requirements for nuclear and other radioactive materials in authorization processes. | MENPR, Ministry of Finances, MOIA MOD | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Import and export of radioactive materials is regulated by issuing of special permit. |
| 1.F.3 | Include provisions for transport of nuclear and other radioactive material in regulatory requirements. | MENPR Ministry of Economy | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are general terms for transportation in the framework. The new regulation: Rules on transportation of radioactive material is at drafting process and will be adopted until January 1, 2016 |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| <i>Action</i> | | <i>Responsible Entity</i> | <i>Status/ Reference</i> | <i>Projected Completion</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|---------------|---|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| | | and Sustainable Development MOIA | | | |
| 1.F.4 | Establish verification and enforcement measures to ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations and requirements, including the imposition of appropriate and effective sanctions. | MENPR MOIA SSS | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inspection is a statutory requirement, and MENPR has all of the enforcement powers that it requires. Inspections are conducted according to regulation” On Rules for Inspection of Nuclear and Radiation Activities”, Enforcement actions are defined by laws “On Nuclear and Radiation Safety” , “On Licenses and Permits”, “Administrative Offences Code”, “Criminal Code”, An inspection program is developed on a yearly basis, unplanned inspections are beyond of the annual inspection plan. The license has no time limitation. The license can be revoked, but not suspended on temporary base. |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

Functional Area 2: Prevention

2. A Objective – Identify and assess nuclear security threats and identify targets

| | Action | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|-------|--|--------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---|
| 2.A.1 | Conduct an evaluation of internal and external threats to the State in order to identify and assess those threats specifically related to nuclear security, including their credibility, regardless of whether the targets of the internal nuclear security threats are within or outside the jurisdiction of the State. | MENPR MOIA MOD SSS SSCMC | To be initiated | 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This assessment should identify strategic locations and materials in transport and evaluate the threat of criminal acts and unauthorized acts, with nuclear security implications involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control. • New regulations such as “On security and physical protection of facilities and sources of ionizing radiation” and “Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan to nuclear and radiological emergencies (Section 1.E.7) should be adopted. Once the regulations are in place, a threat evaluation, used to define the Design Basis Threat (see 2.A.2) and should be initiated by MOIA, MOD, MENRP and any other relevant organizations. |
| 2.A.2 | Based on the threat, define the Design Basis Threat (DBT) or similar threat statement, to determine security requirements for selected materials, facilities, or practices including transport. Periodically update DBT or threat statement as the threat changes. | MENPR | To be initiated | 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MENRP requested preparation of a preliminary DBT by the operators of facilities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ IAEA note: the inventory, if complete, should be sufficient information for MENPR to begin requirements for physical protection based off of the threat evaluation. |
| 2.A.3 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, a national DBT workshop to enable participants to acquire a better understanding of a step-by-step methodology and the need for an interactive process between organizations involved. | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS | Complete | 2011 | |
| 2.A.4 | Identify and assess targets, which include strategic locations, based on potential consequences, which require protection from threats. Maintain an up to date assessment of such targets. | MOIA | On-goin | | |

2. B Objective – Establish and maintain appropriate and effective State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC)

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|---|------------------|----------------------|--|
| 2.B.1 | Assess the SSAC to ensure that the system meets nuclear security guidelines. | MENPR | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Georgia joined to CSA (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement) and submits special safeguards reports to the IAEA; Georgia has not joined to the SQP (Small Quantity Protocol) of the IAEA. |
| 2.B.2 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, an IAEA SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) mission to review and support enhancing the SSAC. | MENPR IAEA/NSNS IAEA/SG | Complete | July 2008 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The mission was conducted. |
| 2.B.3 | Implement, or otherwise address, ISSAS mission recommendations. Seek IAEA or other donor support as necessary. | MENPR IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The recommendations are considered to establish electronic system for inventory of nuclear materials. |
| 2.B.4 | Provide training in SSAC systems for nuclear materials and associated facilities and activities, sponsored by the IAEA or other donors. | MENPR IAEA/NSNS IAEA/SG Donors | On-going | Continuous | |

2. C Objective – Establish and maintain appropriate and effective physical protection measures for nuclear material and facilities in order to prevent unauthorized removal and sabotage

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|--|------------------|----------------------|--|
| 2.C.1 | Review physical protection measures and security plans at relevant facilities, activities, or other locations and assess compliance with requirements, and identify upgrades if necessary. Include assessment of the provisions for maintenance and technical support to ensure future sustainability of installed systems. | MENPR US DoE/NNSA/GTRI UK DECC GTRI Swedish Nuclear safety Authority (SSM) Facilities | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> High level of security and physical protection measures applied to protect nuclear and radioactive material in Georgia. US DoE/NNSA/GTRI, UK DECC/GTRI and Swedish Regulatory Authority and DOE/NNSA and Swedish SSM are providing assistance. However, Georgia needs to elaborate in its legislation and regulations the specific requirements for physical protection. When MENPR conducts inspections it should also review the physical protection measures to ensure they're working. MENPR should be immediately informed by operators if they change their physical protection measures. Physical protection of disposal site was upgraded by IAEA&UK support. |
| 2.C.2 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission or similar technical expert mission to | MENPR Facilities IAEA/NSNS | Complete | 2008 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IAEA recommendations on physical protection upgrades were provided in the IPPAS 2008 report DOE/NNSA and Swedish SSM have assessed physical protection measures at sites. |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | | | | |
|-------|---|---|----------|------------|--|
| | support the review of security attributes at relevant facilities. | | | | |
| 2.C.3 | Implement, or otherwise address, IPPAS mission recommendations and conduct physical protection upgrades, as required. | MENPR Facilities IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical protection upgrades at relevant facilities are being completed by the U.S., UK, and IAEA. |
| 2.C.4 | Provide training in physical protection of nuclear materials and associated facilities and activities, sponsored by the IAEA or other donors. | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical protection trainings were conducted by US DoE support. |

2. D Objective – Complete and maintain a national register of radioactive sources and other radioactive material

| Action | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|--|--------------------|----------------------|--|
| 2.D.1 | Establish procedures for registering and updating information for the inventory of radioactive material. | MENPR | Complete | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legal basis for inventory of radioactive sources, waste and associated activities is defined by regulation “Rules on inventory of sources of ionizing radiation, radioactive waste and authorization, categorization of the sources of ionizing radiation” The regulation also establishes categorization of radioactive sources and radioactive waste classification in accordance of IAEA norms. |
| 2.D.2 | Maintain a current register/inventory of categorized radioactive sources and other radioactive material. | MENPR Operators | On-going | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Georgia has a complete register as of today, and is using RASOD module from ARIS 1.5 software created with US NRC support. Interface of RAIS also was translated to the Georgian language. |
| 2.D.3 | Establish and carryout procedures for <u>verifying</u> the current register/inventory of sources on a regular basis. | MENPR Operators | On-going | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MENPR conducts onsite inspections. It assembles an inspection plan prior to the inspection. Licensee is obliged to inform DNRS of any changes in its activity. Transfer of radioactive source can be conducted only on basis of specially issued permit. |

2. E Objective–Establish and maintain appropriate and effective physical protection measures for radioactive sources and other radioactive material in use, storage, and manufacture in order to prevent unauthorized removal and sabotage

| Action | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks | |
|--------|--|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|--|
| 2.E.1 | Review physical protection measures and security plans at relevant facilities, activities, or other locations and assess | MENPR IAEA U.S. DOE | On-going | Continuous and complete | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of documentations on physical protection system is usually carried out prior to granting of license. Verification is a part of regular inspections. TRI’s scope of work covers the upgrade of physical protection systems of |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | | | | |
|--------------|--|--|----------|------------|--|
| | compliance with established requirements, and identify upgrades if necessary. Include review of provisions for future sustainability of installed systems. | UK Sweden | | | <p>facilities operating with or storing high activity radiation sources (more than 10 Ci for Co60, Cs137, Sr90, Ir192, Am241, Ra226).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Facilities involved: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Centralized storage facility (Institute of Physics); ▪ Oncology Centers (Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi); ▪ SSDL (Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory); • The UK DECC/GTRI funded the upgrade of the physical protection infrastructure of the Saakadze waste disposal facility in Georgia through the contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). With regard to this work, the Agency conducted an assessment mission to the facility in January 2011 jointly with representatives of Georgia and the UK. In July 2012 a contract was awarded to a local company to perform the upgrades. In the mid-2013 the contractor has started the preparatory works on site and started the construction of the guard house and site infrastructure. The whole PP upgrade was completed at the end of 2014. • There may be remaining sites that require physical protection upgrades, such as commercial industrial radiographers. MENRP should assess whether these require physical protection. |
| 2.E.2 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, an IAEA technical expert mission or other donor mission, to support the review of security arrangements at relevant facilities. | NRSS Facilities IAEA/NSNS U.S. DOE UK, US NRC | Complete | On-going | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement between MENRP of Georgia and the US DoE on Cooperation to Enhance the Security of Georgia’s High Activity Radiation Sources |
| 2.E.3 | Establish/designate secure storage facility(s) with proper physical protection elements for radioactive material not in use, sources found out of regulatory control, and seized material. | NRSS | Complete | 2015 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CSF was constructed in 2007 with the assistance of the US DOE at the site of the Institute of Physics (currently the part of Tbilisi State University). A special security network for the CSF off-site monitoring (with terminals to the DNRS office, MIA office and Institute of Physics office) was established. The security measures were upgraded by US DoE/NNSA/GTRI at 2015. |
| 2.E.4 | Periodically perform follow-up technical assessments to confirm the satisfactory maintenance and operation of appropriate effective physical protection measures. | MENPR IAEA/NSNS U.S. DOE UK | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GTRI’s scope of work includes long-term warranty and maintenance of upgraded/installed physical protection systems. • Georgia should consider a long-term strategy and maintenance plan to support and develop additional physical protection systems. • Checking of operability of physical protection system is conducted during the inspection activity. |
| 2.E.5 | Search for sources out of regulatory control. | MENPR MIA MOJ IAEA U.S. UK | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Georgia has conducted numerous search efforts. A number of sources were found and recovered. • The IAEA has provided assistance to DNRS in locating and securing uncontrolled sources (GEO/9/004). • U.S. DoE previously provided equipment and training to the DNRS to search for and secure sources. MENPR has claimed that these resources are sufficient for basic searches, but not for more complicated searches. |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | | | | |
|--------------|--|--|----------|------------|--|
| 2.E.6 | Take measures to transfer disused sources and sources found to be out of regulatory control to a secure storage facility. Seek, as necessary, IAEA or other donor support for carrying out this activity for vulnerable high activity sources. | MENPR Facilities IAEA/NSNS U.S. UK | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. DOE funded the removal of disused high-level radioactive sources from some vulnerable facilities. • GTRI's scope of work covers the consolidation of disused high activity radiation sources and the dismantling/decommissioning of facilities with high activity radiation sources (scientific-research irradiators) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Institute of Plant Protection, Tbilisi State University, Georgian Agrarian University (irradiators dismantled); ○ Teletherapy units of former Tbilisi 9th hospital and Rail hospital (dismantling); ○ Searching of abandoned sources (Western Georgia, Anaseuli site). • There is no national program for addressing this action. However, when a source becomes disused, the license holder <i>should</i> pay for the safe keeping and return to a storage facility or manufacturer., Sources found out of regulatory control are removed by MENRP and placed in storage. • All identified disused high activity sources are safely disposed at the storage facility. • MENRP has access to equipment for the handling with radioactive sources to conduct recovery operation. Source recovery operations usually conducted by Emergency Management Agency of Ministry of Internal affairs under supervision of DNRS. |
| 2.E.7 | Pursue options for returning vulnerable disused sources to manufacturers. Seek, as necessary, IAEA or other donor support for carrying out this activity. | MENPR Facilities IAEA/NSNS | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a source is imported, usually the licensee is responsible for returning the sources to the manufacturers. In cases where this requirement was not yet in place when the license was issued, MENRP (DNRS) is taking responsibility to ensure safe transfer of source to storage facility. |
| 2.E.8 | Provide training in physical protection of radioactive sources and other radioactive material in use, storage, and manufacture, sponsored by the IAEA or other donors. | MENPR MOIA MOD IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GTRI is engaged in providing training to Georgian personnel. • Georgia is encouraged to become a member of the IAEA Working Group on Radioactive Source Security (WGRSS). |

2. F Objective – Establish and maintain appropriate and effective physical protection measures for transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials

| | <i>Action</i> | <i>Responsible Entity</i> | <i>Status/ Reference</i> | <i>Projected Completion</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|--------------|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 2.F.1 | Operators conduct evaluations based on <i>performance testing</i> as appropriate, by <i>shippers</i> and/or carriers for <i>transport</i> . Evaluations should be reviewed by the competent authority. | MENPR MOIA MOF Operators | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Georgian Law “On Nuclear and Radiation Safety” (5912) considers issuing the license for transport of nuclear materials, radioactive sources, and radioactive waste, which gives the right to conduct the transport of radioactive sources The radioactive source owner is responsible for transport its radioactive sources which are defined as license conditions. • Two technical regulations “Transport by Roads” and “Transport of Dangerous |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | | | | |
|--------------|---|---|-----------------|------|---|
| | | | | | <p>Loads by Air” set general requirement for transport conditions or dangerous substances including radioactive materials.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New regulation “On Procedure for Transportation of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances” (should be adopted until January 1, 2016) should define the followings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ requirements that the regulatory body has implemented for the security of radioactive sources during transport. ○ procedures that the regulatory body, in cooperation with other relevant competent authorities, has implemented to track any movement of high-risk sources. |
| 2.F.2 | Transport security plans cover transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials, as necessary based on the classification of the material involved. | MENPR MOIA MOF Operators | To be initiated | 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New regulation “On Physical Security (Protection) of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities, Radioactive Sources and Waste, and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation” should define the classes for physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials |
| 2.F.3 | Provide training in nuclear and other radioactive material transport security from the IAEA or other donors. | MENPR MOIA MOF IAEA/NSNS Donors | To be initiated | 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Finance has requested training for its officials that are responsible for the import/export of sources, developing of a security |

Functional Area 3: Detection

3. A Objective – Establish a national strategy for developing and maintaining appropriate and effective systems for detecting, deterring, preventing, and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radiological materials

| <i>Action</i> | <i>Responsible Entity</i> | <i>Status/ Reference</i> | <i>Projected Completion</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| 3.A.1 Develop a national strategy for detection of a criminal act, or an unauthorized act, with nuclear security implications involving nuclear or other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. | MOIA MOF MENPR SSS SSCMC | To be initiated | 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Georgia is a member of the GICNT Working Group on Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture Series. A formal national detection strategy does not exist. Coordination of Nuclear Detection Strategy development will be carried out according to the Georgian Legislation. CBRN thread reduction strategy and supplementary action plan has been approved. |
| 3.A.2 Conduct, upon request and as needed, a peer review mission to assist in drafting/reviewing the proposed detection strategy. | IAEA/NSNS Donors | To be requested | 2016-2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Georgia will request an advisory mission to assist in developing a detection strategy which takes into account its existing detection capabilities. Georgia is going to receive IAEA IRSS mission covering all subjects for nuclear and radiation safety and security. |
| 3.A.3 Adopt the national detection strategy. | Relevant Ministries | Pending 3.A.3 | | |

3. B Objective - Deploy and maintain appropriate⁶ and effective monitoring and radiation detection equipment according to priorities established in the national detection strategy

| <i>Action</i> | <i>Responsible Entity</i> | <i>Status/ Reference</i> | <i>Projected Completion</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|---------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|
|---------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | | | |
|---------------------|---|--|-----------------|--|
| <p>3.B.1</p> | <p>Acquire, install, and calibrate monitoring and radiation detection equipment according to priorities established in the national detection strategy. Where resource limitations exist request support from IAEA or other donors.</p> | <p>MOIA MOF SSS IAEA/NSNS U.S. DOE EXBS DTRA</p> | <p>On-going</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1540 Committee Report noted that all major road, sea, railroad and air border checkpoints are fully equipped with radiation-detection equipment. • Based on a needs assessment mission (INSServ) completed in 2003, the IAEA provided equipment between 2004-2007: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Upgrade: Border Detection Equipment for Georgia, 2007 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The deliveries of the following equipment for Poti sea port and mobile expert support team were completed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three vehicle RPMs • One pedestrian RPM • 9 RIDs • 25 PRDs ▪ End user: Revenue Service, Ministry of Finances. • Through the projects of U.S. DOE and DOD, MOIA has received technical equipment (radiation detection pagers, hand-held equipment, survey meters, identifiers and vans with radiation detection monitors), and police officers have received specialized training. U.S. has also provided portable radiation detection equipment, thermal imaging cameras, personal utility tool belts, training, and other support for this project. • DoE SLD program ensured full-scale support to Georgia's border infrastructure with provision, installation, testing and maintenance of radiation portal monitoring system. • The United States has made significant contributions to the development of the Coast Guard, and with U.S. support, Coast Guard bases and stations were built and equipped. Georgia received vessels, computers and communications and other types of equipment. English-language laboratories were created at the Poti and Batumi bases. • Video control (CCTV) cameras at border checkpoints are connected to the central database, allowing for 24/7 control. The Personal Identification and Registration System is installed at all border checkpoints • The European Commission/JRC has also provided extensive equipment. • In addition, the employees of the Patrol Police Department at the border checkpoints are equipped with hand pagers, personal radiation detectors and radioactive isotope detectors. • Special secondary standard laboratory is established to conduct calibration of radiation measurement equipment • Activities to enhance technical capability of radiation detection is continuing |
| <p>3.B.2</p> | <p>Establish a national capability to search on green borders.</p> | <p>MOIA MENPR SSS</p> | <p>On-going</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Patrol Police Department is equipped on the whole territory of Georgia with a mobile system for the detection of radioactive materials. National communications systems were also established to unite the local and mobile systems in a single network. • The United States has constructed a patrol outpost along one section of the green border, but additional donors will be needed to provide portable outposts |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | | | | |
|--------------|---|---|----------|------------|--|
| | | | | | <p>in other sectors and perhaps other equipment and training.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project between NSOI and Georgia to introduce Mobile Radiation Detection Patrols intends to improve the capability to detect radioactive materials trafficked within Georgia considers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Providing MOIA personnel with radiation detection vans and handheld detectors (personal radiation pagers, radio-isotopic identifiers, and radiation survey meters) to establish mobile patrols along key highways and other chokepoints. ○ Conducting training to the MOIA on nuclear smuggling trends, operation and maintenance of the equipment, and the appropriate response procedures if radioactive material is discovered. ○ Coordinating with U.S. assistance providers to ensure the equipment deployed is compatible with equipment used on the borders and takes advantage of existing assets for support and maintenance. • On-going project between Georgia and NSOI for Support for Georgian Coast Guard, intended to improve monitoring of Georgia’s maritime zones through increased patrolling of its coastline. |
| 3.B.3 | Service and maintain equipment to ensure sustained, reliable, and accurate operation. | MOIA MOF SSS U.S. | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. Department of Energy is providing financial support to maintain the fixed radiation monitors installed through the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program. • MOIA technical specialists provide routine maintenance; SLD provides corrective repairs. SLD has also trained MOIA personnel to provide maintenance; SLD has provided a basic amount of equipment for replacements. SLD continues to provide repairs and replacements if necessary. |
| 3.B.4 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, a technical advisory mission for establishing nuclear security systems for detection by instruments of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. | MOIA SSS MOF IAEA/NSNS U.S. DOE DTRA | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Georgia has a well-established detection architecture (see 3.B.1 and 3.B.2). |
| 3.B.5 | Provide training in the proper operation of detection equipment by front line officers or primary equipment operators. | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are several successful ongoing projects in the radiation security area, including the Defence Threat Reduction Agency and the Export Control and Border Security programme. Within the framework of the projects, MOIA employees are trained to improve the professional skills of law enforcement officers to detect, investigate and carry out special operations with regard to the transport of prohibited substances and dual-use (controlled) technology. • Improved coordination on training, possibly orchestrated through a national human resource development program, would assist in ensuring the longevity of the detection program and the improved utility of trainings. • In 2006, SLD installed a vehicle RPM and pedestrian RPM at the Lilo training |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| | | | | | <p>centre (MoIA), for training purposes. Since 2010 Lilo training centre is conducting regular trainings for front-line officers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• SLD has trained over 100 Border Police/Patrol Police officers and over 40 Revenue Service officers in operations, response, and maintenance of RPMs.• Border guards and customers equipped with hand detectors and spectrometers to conduct secondary investigation of suspected goods are properly trained by Georgian specialists; the training materials are based on the IAEA requirements.• 1540 Committee Report noted that Police officers as well as customs officials have been trained in appropriate procedures.• NTC: Radiation Detection Equipment for Front Line Officers, Poti, Georgia, 15-19 October 2007 (specific focus on the Poti Seaport.) |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|

Functional Area 4: Response

4.A Objective–Establish a national response system for responding to a criminal act, or an unauthorized act, with nuclear security implications involving nuclear or other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control.

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/ Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|---------------|---|--|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 4.A.1 | Develop a national plan to respond to incidents involving nuclear/radioactive material, searching for materials out of regulatory control and including seizure of such material by law enforcement authorities. | MOIA SSS MOF MENPR | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decree of Government #397 (24 December 2010) “rules for joint action in case of detection of radioactive materials at border checkpoints, airports, sea ports and maritime areas” identifies responsible agencies and procedures for respective actions. Document is addressed only to joint actions performing at the state borders and some follow-up activities limited to transportation of detained material to storage site but there are no elements of nuclear forensics and criminal investigations presented. Order of Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Protection # 150 “Rules on response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material”, (08.12.2014) established the main responsibilities in case of response to such an events. Instructions/ guides needed to be drafted and adopted. Law “On Nuclear and Radiation Safety” 9512) considers adoption until January 2016 the secondary regulation – Emergency Preparedness and response Plan to nuclear and radiological emergencies. |
| 4.A.2 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, peer review assistance to draft/review the response plan. | IAEA/NSNS U.S. EU | continuous | | |
| 4.A.3 | Prepare procedures for response to seizure of suspected nuclear/radioactive material in accordance with the response plan. | Relevant Ministries (see 4.A.1) | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procedures exist and are in operation at the borders. |
| 4.A.4 | Periodically exercise, test, and evaluate the plans for effectiveness by relevant competent authorities and authorized persons with the aim of ensuring timely and effective implementation of a comprehensive response plan. | MOIA MOF SSS Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development MENPR | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In May 2009, the U.S. Department of State Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) organized a table-top exercise in Tbilisi. Response capabilities are being exercised in real life scenarios |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | Action | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|-------|--|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | Operators U.S. | | | |
| 4.A.5 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, peer review assistance/expertise to participate and give advice during the exercise(s). | IAEA/NSNS MOIA MENRP | To be requested | 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Georgia is going to receive IRSS mission to cover all areas for radiation safety and security. • Georgia participates in cross-border exercises with neighbours; for example, the MOIA has conducted FTXs with Armenia (supported by SLD, EXBS, DTRA, and JRC) in the past and would be interested in conducting others with international partners. • SLD and FBI have jointly supported training and field exercise, “Mobile Detection in the Interdiction of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive materials,” in Tbilisi in September 2009. |
| 4.A.6 | Implement provisions and procedures of the response plan. | Relevant Ministries (noted 4.A.1) | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elements of the response plan are already in place. Full implementation pending 4.A.6. |
| 4.A.7 | Provide training in the area of response activities and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. | Relevant Ministries (noted 4.A.1) | On-going | Continuous | |

4.B Objective – Establish and maintain national capability to provide technical support to front line detection capabilities and to categorize and characterize suspected radioactive material.

| | Action | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|-------|--|--|------------------|----------------------|---|
| 4.B.1 | Acquire detection and other technical equipment for the national organization designated to categorize suspected radioactive material. | MOIA Border Police Customs Service DNRS IAEA | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IAEA has provided the following equipment under the project “Development of National Infrastructure for Response to Unauthorized Acts Involving Nuclear and other Radioactive Material –Georgia, 2009,” to the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources, in their capacity of expert support team: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 5 PRDs ▪ 3 RIDs ▪ 1 HPGE detector ▪ 1 Spectral portable radiation scanner • Ministry of Finance will provide a list of equipment that it has and equipment that it needs for secondary inspection. • Upcoming technical regulation "On Physical Security (Protection) of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities, Radioactive Sources and Waste, and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation” will establish classification of materials and physical |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | Action | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|-------|--|--|------------------|----------------------|--|
| | | | | | protection systems for those. |
| 4.B.2 | Establish a sustainable national technical capability to support front line detection of nuclear and other radioactive material. | MOIA Border Police Customs Service DNRS | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DNRS conducts the preliminary assessment of detected materials • NSOI has organized a project, “Improving Communications and Coordination among Law Enforcement and Border Security Personnel.” <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provide the MOIA, Border Police, Revenue Service, DNRS, and other agencies with portable radios that can provide reliable, robust, secure, and compatible communications. |
| 4.B.3 | Establish a nuclear forensics plan of action for applying nuclear forensics techniques to characterize seized material in a designated laboratory. | Relevant ministries EU U.S. | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Georgia is improving its nuclear forensics capabilities through its participation in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG). Project funded by the EU and US. Project objectives are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Expanded forensics capabilities of Georgia’s scientific community. ○ Improved cooperation between Georgian technical experts and law enforcement community. ○ Improved contacts and cooperation between Georgian scientists and other scientists in the international nuclear forensics community with increased participation in nuclear forensic table-top and analytic exercises. ○ Improved contacts and cooperation between elements of the Georgian law enforcement community and their international counterparts. ○ Create framework for closer adherence to the international best practices on nuclear forensics reflected in the IAEA Nuclear Forensics Support Reference Manual (2006). ○ Through outreach, establish indigenous nuclear forensics capabilities for categorization and characterization. |
| 4.B.4 | Provide training in advanced radiation detection techniques and developing a national technical response capability. | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individuals from Revenue Service would benefit from additional training. |

4.C Objective – Participate in international information exchange and cooperation for nuclear security events

| | Action | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|-------|---|--------------------|------------------|----------------------|---|
| 4.C.1 | Participate in regional and international information exchange and multi-lateral initiatives for coordinating and exchanging information regarding nuclear security events. This includes technical | Government | On-going | Continuous | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1373 Report (2001) noted that Georgia and special services of partner states regularly exchange information between each other to prevent terrorist acts. • 1540 Report noted that Georgia has concluded international agreements with Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Turkey, |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| <i>Action</i> | | <i>Responsible Entity</i> | <i>Status/ Reference</i> | <i>Projected Completion</i> | <i>Remarks</i> |
|---------------|--|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| | cooperation and assistance, cooperation with respect to criminal offences, recovery and return of seized items, and nuclear forensics cooperation. | | | | <p>Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Uzbekistan in the field of combating crime and police cooperation that also provide for cooperation in the sphere of nuclear smuggling.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CBRN COE: In 2012, under the European Commission CBRN centres of excellence initiative, the Government of Georgia officially confirmed its readiness to participate in the implementation of the initiative and to establish the CBRN Secretariat at the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. • Agreement between Georgia and the United States of America on Cooperation to Counteract Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials. • Georgia's participation in cross-border exercises was assessed in the Country Report as a successful demonstration of Georgia's internal, bilateral and international notification and response procedures for the detection and interdiction of illicit trans-border movements of weapons of mass destruction. • Implementing Agreement between the US Department of Energy and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Georgia on enhancing the security and Physical Protection of high activity radiation sources |
| 4.C.2 | Contact the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and nominate a national point of contact for the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB). | Government IAEA/NSNS | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The contact point is nominated |
| 4.C.3 | Report relevant <i>nuclear security events</i> to effected states, or potentially effected states as necessary, and other applicable regional and international organizations in accordance with international obligations and national legislation, including the ITDB. | Government | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports are made due to Georgian internal regulations and ITDB instructions. • Unique communication point established and the DNRS operating as a focal point for the IAEA ITDB • Incidents are routinely reported to the ITDB. |

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

Functional Area 5: Sustainability

5.A Objective – Develop a National Nuclear Security Human Resources Development (HRD) Programme

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------------|--|--|------------------------|----------------------|---|
| 5.A.1 | Perform a Training/Education Needs Analysis (TENA), involving all nuclear security stakeholders in a country <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appoint focal points in each institution; ▪ Arrange for regular meetings to be able to perform a comprehensive training needs analysis in the country; ▪ Request IAEA assistance to perform TENA, if needed | MENPR Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS | To be initiated | 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The RaSSIA mission (2005) reported that there are no formal training or continuous professional development programmes. • Georgia needs to identify the strategic interests in the ownership of human resource development programme as well as the tactical ownership (person or group) who will work with the IAEA to advance this matter. • IAEA assistance will be requested to assist in assessing the human resource needs of all nuclear security stakeholders in Georgia. • DNRS is involved in working group activity for international network for nuclear security training and support centres |
| 5.A.2 | Develop a nuclear security HRD programme tailored to the country's needs, based on the findings of the TENA. | Relevant Ministries | To be initiated | 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This programme should include the requirements for training and an implementation plan for at least the first two years. • MENRP is working to include courses within the Ministry, but these courses do not yet cover security. |
| 5.A.3 | Consider establishing a National Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The activities is going to establish centre within MOIA |
| 5.A.4 | Identify necessary resources (infrastructure and human resources) that can be used immediately or need to be recruited/developed | Relevant Ministries | Pending 5.A.1/5.A.2 | | |
| 5.A.5 | Train and develop qualified instructors. | IAEA/NSNS US Department of State NSOI US DoE GTRI | On-going | Continuous | |

5.B Objective – Establish and Maintain a nuclear security culture

| Action | Responsible | Status/ | Projected | Remarks |
|--------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|
|--------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | <i>Entity</i> | <i>Reference</i> | <i>Completion</i> | |
|--------------|---|--|------------------|-------------------|---|
| 5.B.1 | Give due priority to the security culture, to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in all organizations involved in nuclear security. | Relevant ministries | To be initiated | 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training program in nuclear security culture is needed to identify. |
| 5.B.2 | Provide training in nuclear security culture, sponsored by the IAEA or other donors. | Relevant ministries IAEA/NSNS Donors | To be requested | 2019 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Georgia will be invited to attend future workshops. • It will request additional training on nuclear security culture. |

5. C Objective - *Protect sensitive nuclear security information*

| <i>Action</i> | <i>Responsible Entity</i> | <i>Status/ Reference</i> | <i>Projected Completion</i> | <i>Remarks</i> | |
|---------------|---|---|-----------------------------|----------------|--|
| 5.C.1 | Develop national requirements which define national security information and related information technology systems. | MENPR MOIA, MOD, SSS, Ministry of Finances, Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All information is protected at MENPR, MOIA, MOD, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development. . |
| 5.C.2 | Identify specific information and information technology systems that are considered sensitive in nature and therefore require protection. | Relevant Ministries | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The law “On Sate Secret” establishes mechanism for information classification. |
| 5.C.3 | Ensure facility level security policies and site security plans specifically include the security of information and the security of information systems. | MENPR MOIA SSS MOD Facilities | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operators are requested to keep information secure. • This should be addressed in the revised regulatory framework. |
| 5.C.4 | Provide training in the area of information security related to nuclear and other radioactive materials. | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS Donors | On-going | | |

5. D Objective–*Establish personnel trustworthiness programs to prevent and protect against insider threats*

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|---|------------------|----------------------|---|
| 5.D.1 | Taking into consideration State laws, regulations, or policies regarding personal privacy and job requirements, establish requirements for the determination of personnel trustworthiness for <u>State agency</u> personnel. | MOIA SSS | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procedures established for security clearance of personnel appointed for positions needed access to sensitive information/ facilities/ materials. |
| 5.D.2 | Taking into consideration State laws, regulations, or policies regarding personal privacy and job requirements, establish requirements for the determination of personnel trustworthiness for <u>facility personnel</u> as necessary. | MOIA SSS | Complete | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are arrangements in place to assess the trustworthiness for individuals with access to facilities. |
| 5.D.3 | Ensure preventive measures are in place in facilities or activities to preclude or remove possible insider threats, or to minimize threat opportunities, or to prevent a malicious act from being carried out. | MOIA SSS MENRP Facilities | On-going | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security measures are controlled during the conduction of inspections. |
| 5.D.4 | Provide training on insider threat offered by the IAEA or other donors. | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS Donors | | | |

5. E Objective - Follow-up on progress in implementing proposed Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan actions.

| Action | | Responsible Entity | Status/Reference | Projected Completion | Remarks |
|--------|---|--|------------------|----------------------|---------|
| 5.E.1 | Review progress in implementation of nuclear security activities. Update the INSSP. | Relevant Ministries SSCMC IAEA/NSNS | | 2020 | |

5. F Objective—Conduct multi-disciplinary advisory missions in order to provide independent assessment and validation of completed and sustainable nuclear security activities

| Action | Responsible | Status/ | Projected | Remarks |
|--------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|
|--------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

| | | <i>Entity</i> | <i>Reference</i> | <i>Completion</i> | |
|--------------|---|--|------------------|-------------------|--|
| 5.F.1 | Conduct, upon request and as needed, an International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) Mission to assist in reviewing relevant laws, regulations, and national infrastructure with regard to nuclear security. | Relevant Ministries IAEA/NSNS | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The mission will be requested in case of necessity |
| 5.F.2 | Implement, or otherwise address, INSServ mission recommendations and implement nuclear security system upgrades, as required. | Relevant Ministries Facilities IAEA/NSNS Donors | | | |

Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|--------|---|
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| OLA | IAEA Office of Legal Affairs |
| NSNS | IAEA Office of Nuclear Security |
| NSRW | IAEA Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety |
| NSOI | US Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative |
| DNRS | Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety |
| MEPNR | Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection |
| MOIA | Ministry of Internal Affairs |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| MOF | Ministry of Finances |
| SSS | State Security Service |
| SSCMC | State Security and Crisis Management Council |
| US DoE | United States Department of Energy |
| GTRI | Global Threat Reduction Initiative |
| NNSA | National Nuclear Security Administration |
| RaSSIA | Radiation Safety and Security of Radiation Sources Infrastructure Appraisal |
| ITDB | Illicit Trafficking Data Base |
| ITWG | International Technical Working Group |
| EXBS | Export Control and Border Security program |
| SLD | Second Line Defence program |
| RPL | Radiation Portal Monitor |

General Information Regarding Nuclear and/or Radioactive Material in GEORGIA

Georgia – Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan 2015-2019

1. The Institute of Physics on the outskirts of Tbilisi houses a non-operational IRT-M research reactor. All fresh and spent fuel was transferred from the reactor facility to Scotland in April 1998 under the multinational effort between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Georgia.
2. Sub-criticality assembly “Breeder-1” containing HEU of the Institute of Physics is to be repatriated to the Russian Federation under IAEA-US-RF triparty RSRRR program.
3. The High Energy Physics Institute in Tbilisi and the Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT) do not have fissile material.